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To Move or Not to Move? That Is the 
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David J. Sandefer† 
I’ve crossed some kind of invisible line. I feel as if I’ve come to a place 
I never thought I’d have to come to. And I don’t know how I got here. 
   Raymond Carver1 
 
I move, therefore I am. 
   Haruki Murakami2 
 
Circuit courts are currently split on how to apply the robbery abduction en-
hancement contained in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. As a result of 
patchwork interpretations and a failure to agree on when an abduction occurs, 
courts have come to drastically different conclusions in almost identical cases. In 
order to resolve the circuit split, courts need a functional test that applies a unified 
definition of location. 
This Comment seeks to provide courts with such a test. In proposing this test, 
this Comment looks to (1) the Guidelines, (2) sexual assault case law, and (3) kid-
napping case law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers have long pondered the metaphysical meaning 
of an object’s “location” or the “where of a thing.” For example, 
Aristotle considered location as one of the ten aspects of an ob-
ject’s being.3 However, debating the definition of location is not 
solely within the domain of philosophers—location is often an im-
portant factor in the law. For crimes in which a change in location 
is a necessary element, courts must use and apply a definition of 
location. This definition, when applied, often serves a significant 
purpose. If a kidnapping conviction requires a change in location, 
could this change in location requirement be met by movement 
within state lines? Within a city block? Within a building? Within 
a room?4 If distance is not the determining factor in defining a 
change in location, what factor or factors should be used in its 
place? Should the type of forced movement matter? 
Developing a precise definition of location is particularly im-
portant for courts in determining when to apply abduction related 
enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(USSG). These abduction enhancements, which apply when sen-
tencing offenders convicted of robbery or sexual abuse, apply only 
 
 3 Aristotle, Categories 7 (Oxford 1963) (J.L. Ackrill, trans). Other aspects mentioned 
by Aristotle include quantity and quality. 
 4 Courts have addressed this exact issue. See United States v Archuleta, 865 F3d 
1280, 1293 (10th Cir 2017) (Seymour concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]t what 
level of abstraction should a court define the term location? For example, if a person were 
standing behind three people in the cashier’s line in the lobby of a bank and the bank was 
located in Dallas, Texas, what is that person’s location? Fourth in line? The lobby of a 
bank? A bank? Dallas? Texas? The United States of America?”). 
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when the offender forces the victim to change location.5 As such, 
the definition of location that courts use can determine whether 
an abduction enhancement is applied to an offender’s sentence. 
Recently a circuit split has arisen as to how location should be 
defined and applied in robbery cases.6 As a result of these differ-
ing definitions of location, some circuits have held that the rob-
bery abduction enhancement applies to forced movement within 
a room or building, while other circuits have reached different 
conclusions.7 
This Comment analyzes how location and forced movement 
are defined under robbery abduction enhancement provisions 
within the Guidelines. This Comment proceeds in three parts. 
Part I provides an introduction to the Sentencing Reform Act8 
(SRA) and a cursory glance at the robbery abduction enhance-
ment. Part II defines the circuit split and surveys the different 
approaches used by the circuits. Part III proposes a two-part bal-
ancing test that resolves the circuit split. The proposed balancing 
test weighs both the dangerousness of the forced movement and 
whether the forced movement occurred over a substantial dis-
tance. This balancing test also maintains the distinction between 
sentencing enhancements for robbery crimes involving abduction 
and physical restraint, and it provides courts with a practical test 
rooted in sexual assault and kidnapping case law. 
I.  ORIENTING WITHIN THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT: 
ESTABLISHING A BEARING 
This Part explains the background behind the SRA while also 
describing the robbery abduction enhancement that is reviewed 
in detail throughout this Comment. Part I.A describes the SRA, 
and Part I.B analyzes the robbery abduction enhancement. 
A. The Sentencing Reform Act 
Congress enacted the SRA as part of the broader 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.9 This legislation cre-
ated the United States Sentencing Commission, which in turn 
promulgates the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.10 These Federal 
 
 5 USSG §§ 2A3.1(b)(5), 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). 
 6 See Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1285–88. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987 (1984), codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq. 
 9 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976, codified as amended at 18 USC § 1 et seq. 
 10 28 USC § 994. 
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Sentencing Guidelines were created, in part, to fix pervasive “in-
determinate sentencing,” which resulted in “criminal defendants 
fac[ing] starkly different levels of punishment depending on 
which judge happened to draw the case.”11 With the goal of “min-
imiz[ing] the discretionary powers of the sentencing court,” 
Congress attempted to bring “honesty,” “uniformity,” and “propor-
tionality” to sentencing by “balanc[ing] the comparative virtues 
and vices of broad, simple categorization and detailed, complex 
subcategorization.”12 These structural changes aimed to “reduce 
crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.”13 
To determine the recommended sentence under the 
Guidelines, courts first determine the base offense level and then 
apply “any appropriate specific offense characteristics, cross ref-
erences, and special instructions contained in the particular 
guideline.”14 These sentencing modifications add or subtract lev-
els from the base offense level associated with the criminal act.15 
Particularly, “specific offense characteristics” encompass factual 
patterns that, if applicable, increase or decrease the base offense 
level. The final offense level, combined with the offender’s “crim-
inal history category,” determines the final sentencing range. For 
example, a four-level enhancement applied to an offender in the 
third criminal history category and an offense with a base level of 
nineteen would increase the sentencing recommendation under 
the Guidelines from between thirty-seven and forty-six months to 
between fifty-seven and seventy-one months.16 
Although the SRA was originally intended to be a mandatory 
restriction on judicial discretion, in 2005 the Supreme Court 
struck down the mandatory sentencing aspects of the Guidelines, 
 
 11 Ryan W. Scott, Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity after Booker: A First Look, 63 
Stan L Rev 1, 6 (2010). 
 12 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1A3 at 1.2–1.3 (1987). 
 13 Id § 1A3 at 1.2. 
 14 USSG § 1B1.1(a)(2). 
 15 See Laura Waters, A Power and a Duty: Prosecutorial Discretion and Obligation 
in United States Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1(b), 34 Cardozo L Rev 813, 818 n 26 (2012) 
(describing how enhancement provisions and mitigating factors function when calculating 
the applicable sentencing level for a robbery conviction). 
 16 See USSG § 5A, Sentencing Table. 
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essentially restricting the Guidelines to an advisory-only capac-
ity.17 Despite the nonbinding nature of the Guidelines, many sen-
tences still fall within the recommended range.18 For this reason, 
whether a special offense characteristic applies can often affect a 
sentence—adding or subtracting months or even years. 
B. The Robbery Abduction Enhancement 
The Guidelines provide for a four-level sentencing enhance-
ment during the sentencing phase of a robbery case “[i]f any per-
son was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to fa-
cilitate escape”19 and a two-level sentencing enhancement “if any 
person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the 
offense or to facilitate escape.”20 The four-level robbery abduction 
enhancement and the two-level physical restraint enhancement 
are separated by the word “or,”21 thus implying that the enhance-
ments apply to different behavior.22 
In regard to the four-level sentencing enhancement for an ab-
duction committed during a robbery, the text of the Guidelines 
does not clarify what elements are required to establish an “ab-
duct[ion].”23 However, the commentary to the Guidelines notes 
that the physical restraint and abduction enhancements “pro-
vide[ ] an enhancement for robberies where a victim was forced to 
accompany the defendant to another location, or was physically 
 
 17 See United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 246 (2005). However, it is important to 
note that some elements of the SRA do remain mandatory. For example, sentencing courts 
are still required to “state the reasons for a sentence” if the sentence is outside of, or even 
within, the Guidelines’ recommendations. See United States v Jones, 460 F3d 191, 196 (2d 
Cir 2006) (remanding with instructions to amend the written judgment to comply with 18 
USC § 3553(c)(2)). Appellate courts are also able to overturn a sentence if the sentencing 
court “fail[ed] to calculate (or improperly calculat[ed]) the Guidelines range.” Gall v United 
States, 552 US 38, 51 (2007). 
 18 See Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment (The Atlantic, 
Feb 25, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/HQF8-VEEW. See also U.S. Sentencing  
Commission Final Quarterly Data Report (2015) *2 (United States Sentencing 
Commission, Mar 25, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/LTG2-X7JW (finding that 47.3 
percent of cases in 2015 fell within the Guidelines range). 
 19 USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). 
 20 USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). 
 21 USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4). 
 22 See United States v Gall, 116 F3d 228, 229 (7th Cir 1997) (“In the plea agreement, the 
parties agreed to disagree about whether Mr. Gall’s conduct concerning the robberies consti-
tuted ‘abduction,’ as the government contended, or ‘physical restraint,’ as Mr. Gall asserted. 
. . . The practical implication for Mr. Gall is an additional 47 months of incarceration.”). 
 23 See USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). 
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restrained by being tied, bound, or locked up.”24 This statement 
implies that the robbery abduction enhancement applies if the 
victim “was forced to accompany the defendant to another loca-
tion,” while the physical restraint enhancement applies if the vic-
tim “was physically restrained by being tied, bound, or locked 
up.”25 In fact, elsewhere, the Guidelines commentary describes 
“physically restrained” identically—as “whether the victim was 
physically restrained by being tied, bound, or locked up.”26 It is 
important to note that, in clarifying how the physical restraint 
enhancement should be applied, the Guidelines commentary pref-
aces “tied, bound, or locked up” with the phrase “such as,”27 im-
plying that these characteristics are not exhaustive. The essential 
difference between the two enhancements is that, unlike the 
physical restraint enhancement, the robbery abduction enhance-
ment requires forced movement to a different location. Although, 
as mentioned above, the two enhancements appear designed to 
address different behavior, they are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive because there are some circumstances in which physical 
restraint can occur during the process of an abduction.28 
The commentary in the application notes defines abduction 
by noting that “[a]bducted means that a victim was forced to ac-
company an offender to a different location.”29 As an example, the 
commentary mentions that “a bank robber’s forcing a bank teller 
from the bank into a getaway car would constitute an abduc-
tion.”30 Although it is difficult to point to one set of facts that 
 
 24 USSG § 2B3.1, Background. The Supreme Court has held that courts may cite the 
commentary as authority when issuing a sentencing decision. Stinson v United States, 508 
US 36, 38 (1993). 
 25 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(K). 
 26 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(K). 
 27 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(K). 
 28 United States v Strong, 826 F3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir 2016) (describing a situation 
in which the conduct during an abduction also merited applying the restraint enhance-
ment). See Part III.A.2 for further discussion on courts applying both physical restraint 
and abduction enhancements. 
 29 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A) (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme 
Court has held that the requirement of forced accompaniment, by itself, does not connote 
a distance requirement. Whitfield v United States, 135 S Ct 785, 789 (2015). However, it’s 
important to note that, unlike the text at issue in Whitfield, the abduction enhancement 
also requires that the victim was forced to change location. 
 30 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A). 
2018] To Move or Not to Move? 1979 
 
would most clearly fall under the robbery abduction enhance-
ment, forced movement occurring over a great distance is likely 
an obvious target of the enhancement.31 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: SETTING A TRAJECTORY 
Different circuits have reached differing conclusions as to 
when the robbery abduction enhancement under the Guidelines 
should be applied. These differences are most stark in cases that 
involve the forced movement of victims from one room or area to 
another room or area within the same building. The Tenth Circuit 
has described the differing approaches as a true “split of author-
ity.”32 Regardless of whether the differing analyses constitute a 
traditional circuit split, the various approaches lead to drastically 
divergent results when applied to similar fact patterns, as I de-
scribe below. Because questions concerning the abduction en-
hancement are pertinent in many robbery scenarios, and because 
the robbery abduction enhancement can add months or years to a 
sentence recommendation, the parameters and application of the 
robbery abduction enhancement are significant. 
The divergent analyses stem from dissimilar interpretations 
of the phrase “different location.”33 While the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Tenth Circuits have all concluded that forced movement 
within a building or small area may fit the “different location” 
language used in the Guidelines commentary,34 the Seventh, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have each applied a narrower con-
ception of movement.35 
This Part describes the circuit split by discussing the differ-
ent interpretations of the robbery abduction enhancement. 
Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C detail the varying approaches used by 
the various circuits. Part II.D then summarizes the flaws with 
each circuit’s approach. 
 
 31 See, for example, United States v Smith, 767 F3d 187, 190–91 (3d Cir 2014) (hold-
ing that forced movement in a vehicle, from the side of a road to a bank parking lot, con-
stituted an abduction). 
 32 Archuleta, 865 F3d 1280, 1293 (10th Cir 2017). However, the Eleventh Circuit has 
framed the issue as “sister circuits [taking] a case-by-case approach to the application of 
the enhancement” instead of as a true circuit split. United States v Whatley, 719 F3d 1206, 
1222 (11th Cir 2013). 
 33 See Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1287 (“[W]hat appears to divide the circuits is a differ-
ence of opinion regarding the meaning of the term ‘location.’”). 
 34 See Parts II.A–B. 
 35 See Part II.C. 
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A. The Flexible Interpretation 
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that courts should 
interpret the phrase “different location” flexibly.36 In practice, in-
terpreting the Guidelines in a flexible manner favors the use of 
the robbery abduction enhancement because satisfying any one of 
several factors allows these circuits to apply the abduction en-
hancement. Consequently, this flexible interpretation has led the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits to hold that the forced movement be-
tween different rooms or areas within the same building may con-
stitute an abduction under the Guidelines. 
In United States v Hawkins,37 the Fifth Circuit provided and 
applied a flexible definition of location.38 In Hawkins, the offender 
physically moved the victim “50 to 60” feet at gunpoint within the 
boundaries of a parking lot toward a getaway car.39 While defining 
the phrase “different location” for purposes of the robbery abduc-
tion enhancement, the Hawkins Court endorsed the use of “mul-
tiple interpretations . . . applied case by case to the particular 
facts under scrutiny, not mechanically based on the presence or 
absence of doorways, lot lines, thresholds, and the like.”40 Citing 
“ordinary parlance,” the court first determined that “‘location’ can 
refer to a point inside or outside a building or parking lot, so that 
a minuscule movement, such as the crossing of a threshold sepa-
rating the interior and exterior of a building, would constitute 
movement to ‘a different location.’”41 However, also citing “ordi-
nary parlance,” the court concluded that “location” may instead 
be “used in reference to a single point where a person is standing, 
or to one among several rooms in the same structure, or to differ-
ent floors in the same building.”42 After acknowledging that both 
interpretations of “location” had merit, the Hawkins court held 
that courts applying the robbery abduction enhancement should 
define “location” based on the “particular facts under scrutiny” 
while also considering whether the offender crossed a threshold.43 
 
 36 See United States v Osborne, 514 F3d 377, 390 (4th Cir 2008); United States v 
Hawkins, 87 F3d 722, 727–28 (5th Cir 1996). 
 37 87 F3d 722 (5th Cir 1996). 
 38 Id at 727. 
 39 Id at 726. 
 40 Id at 728. 
 41 Hawkins, 87 F3d at 727. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id at 728. The court clarified the interaction of these two factors by stating that, 
while movement over a threshold “might be [a] factor[ ] giving support to a conclusion of 
‘different locations,’ the absence of such facts does not bar such a conclusion.” Id at 727. 
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Although the threshold analysis permits courts to apply the 
robbery abduction enhancement in matters involving a relatively 
short distance if a threshold was crossed, defining “different loca-
tion” according to “multiple interpretations”44 allows courts to ap-
ply the robbery abduction enhancement to forced movement in 
almost any situation. The use of a precise or exacting definition 
of location can then cause courts to find that a change in location, 
and thus an abduction, has occurred even in situations involving 
short distances. For example, a court may determine that a 
change in location is defined as a change in position from a par-
ticular spatial point, which in turn allows that court to hold that 
virtually any forced movement meets the “different location” re-
quirement for the robbery abduction enhancement.45 
The Fourth Circuit explicitly endorsed the flexible Hawkins 
analysis in United States v Osborne.46 In Osborne, the court found 
that forced movement occurring within a Walgreens store could 
trigger the robbery abduction requirement because “the phar-
macy section and the store area of the Walgreens building can be 
deemed to be discrete ‘locations.’”47 In reaching this determina-
tion, the Osborne court looked to “ordinary parlance,” which the 
court determined would describe the “pharmacy section and the 
store area [as] ‘different locations’ within the Walgreens build-
ing.”48 The court also noted “that the pharmacy section and the 
store area are divided by a counter, as well as a secured door.”49 
The analysis in Osborne applied the flexible and multiple inter-
pretations approach proffered in Hawkins but contended that or-
dinary parlance and thresholds within the building were grounds 
for determining that a change in location occurred.50 
 
 44 Id at 727–28. 
 45 See, for example, United States v Reynos, 680 F3d 283, 287–90 (3d Cir 2012) 
(adopting the Fifth Circuit’s flexible approach and requiring a mere change in position). 
 46 514 F3d 377 (4th Cir 2008). See also id at 389–90 (“[W]e agree, not only with the 
Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that movement within the confines of a single building can con-
stitute movement ‘to a different location,’ but also with its flexible, case by case approach 
to determining when movement ‘to a different location’ has occurred.”). 
 47 Id at 390. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have offered lower courts virtually no guidance 
on the limits of the flexible analysis. See Part II.D.1. 
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B. The Three-Part Test 
The Third and Tenth Circuits have established a three-part 
test to determine whether movement qualifies as an “abduction” 
for purposes of the Guidelines.51 Unlike the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits, the three-part test used by the Third and Tenth Circuits 
requires (1) forced movement, (2) accompaniment, and (3) an ac-
tion in furtherance of the crime. Functionally, however, this 
three-part test operates almost identically to the flexible analysis 
used by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. Indeed, the Third and 
Tenth Circuits have explicitly adopted the flexible approach.52 
The Third Circuit, in United States v Reynos,53 looked to the 
text of the Guidelines and “distill[ed] three predicates that must 
be met before the abduction enhancement can be applied.”54 To 
establish an abduction, the Third Circuit requires that  
[f]irst, the robbery victims must be forced to move from their 
original position; such force being sufficient to permit a rea-
sonable person an inference that he or she is not at liberty to 
refuse. Second, the victim must accompany the offender to 
that new location. Third, the relocation of the robbery victims 
must have been to further either the commission of the crime 
or the offender’s escape.55 
Although the Third Circuit cited the Guidelines in creating this 
three-part test, the court did not explain how it derived the indi-
vidual components from the Guidelines.56 
The Reynos court’s application of the robbery abduction en-
hancement, given the facts of the case, demonstrates how the 
three-part test functions almost identically to the flexible analy-
sis used by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. In Reynos, the defend-
ant forced store employees at gunpoint to move between thirty-
four and thirty-nine feet from a bathroom to a cash register.57 The 
bathroom in which the victims were located was locked and sepa-
rated from the cash register by a corridor.58 When applying the 
 
 51 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290; Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1287. 
 52 See Reynos, 680 F3d at 290 (“We find the flexible approach outlined in the 
Hawkins and Osborne decisions to have considerable merit.”); Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1288 
(adopting “the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the abduction enhancement”). 
 53 680 F3d 283 (3d Cir 2012). 
 54 Id at 286. 
 55 Id at 286–87. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290. 
 58 Id at 291. 
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first part of the three-part test, the Reynos court determined that 
the victims were forced to move from their original position “[b]y 
virtue of [the bathroom’s] locked door, separate walls and dis-
tance from the cash register.”59 This analysis echoes the flexible 
analysis the Osborne court conducted on thresholds, in which the 
court focused on the counter and secured door that divided the 
“pharmacy section and the store area.”60 However, because almost 
any situation involving forced movement will also involve accom-
paniment and some benefit to the criminal offender, “the first el-
ement is doing all the heavy lifting” under the three-part test.61 
Essentially, the Third Circuit’s three-part test turns on whether 
the offender forced the victim to change location. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Reynos court acknowledged 
that, under its three-part test, “even [ ] the smallest of areas still 
may contain different locations.”62 As an example, the court stated 
that “a judge’s private office may have a location containing a 
desk and computer that is separate and distinct from a location 
containing a conference table and chairs.”63 The dissent in Reynos 
criticized this approach for “‘virtually ensur[ing]’ that any move-
ment at all [ ] result[s] in an abduction enhancement”64 by equat-
ing “location” with a more precise concept of “move[ment] from 
[an] original position.”65 In practice, application of this three-part 
test is contingent on how a court defines and applies a definition 
of location under the flexible analysis—it is easy to imagine courts 
using different definitions of “location” with varying degrees of 
specificity. Although courts in the Third Circuit are bound by the 
three-part test, interpreting “location” flexibly allows these courts 
to reach different conclusions depending on their evaluations of 
the fact-specific nature of each case. The Reynos court justified its 
discretionary test by stating, “It is precisely because of the broad 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Osborne, 514 F3d at 390. 
 61 Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1294 (Seymour concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
[I]t is hard to imagine a scenario where an armed robber would allow his victims 
to move freely about the crime scene after forcing them at gunpoint to move. The 
[ ] second element, that the offender must accompany the victim to their new 
spot, is almost meaningless because there is no distance standard. The third 
element . . . is strikingly similar to this circuit’s test for physical restraint. . . . 
With no distance requirement in its first element, [the] two other elements [ ] 
add very little to the inquiry. 
 62 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290. 
 63 Id at 290. 
 64 Id at 293–94 (Ambro dissenting). 
 65 Id at 287. 
1984 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1973 
 
scope of the term ‘location’ that courts must use a highly flexible 
approach in finding [an abduction].”66 
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v Archuleta,67 “adopt[ed] 
the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the abduction enhancement, 
as well as its three-part test for proof of abduction.”68 In justifying 
its adoption of the Third Circuit’s three-part test, the Tenth 
Circuit referred to the Oxford English Dictionary and Black’s Law 
Dictionary, which respectively define location as “[a] particular 
place or position”69 and “the specific place or position of a person 
or thing.”70 Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit appeared to focus on 
the word “or” in these definitions—the court found it important 
that the dictionary definitions allow for either “place” or “posi-
tion” to be used in defining “location.” The Tenth Circuit first de-
fined the term “place” and concluded that it “is sometimes inter-
preted to refer to ‘[a] building or area used for a specific purpose 
or activity.’”71 The Archuleta court then looked to define the term 
“position” and noted that the word “appears to be more narrowly 
confined to the precise place or spot where a person or thing is 
located at a single moment in time.”72 Like the Reynos court, the 
Archuleta court elected to use this narrow definition of position.73 
By adopting the Third Circuit’s three-part test and its use of 
“position” instead of “place,” the Archuleta court guaranteed that 
almost any movement could constitute a change in location. Be-
cause the commentary looks to a change in “location”74 and “posi-
tion” is defined more precisely than “place,” using “position” as a 
synonym for “location” sets a much lower standard for establish-
ing a change in location. This analysis played out in the Archuleta 
majority’s decision: in determining the applicability of the abduc-
tion enhancement to the forced movement of victims that oc-
curred during a bank robbery, the court held that the “forced 
movement of victims from one room or area to another room or 
area within the same building constitutes an abduction.”75 The 
 
 66 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290. 
 67 865 F3d 1280 (10th Cir 2017). 
 68 Id at 1288. 
 69 Id at 1287, quoting Oxford English Dictionary (online ed 2017). 
 70 Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1287, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (West 10th ed 2014). 
 71 Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1287, quoting Oxford English Dictionary (online ed 2017). 
 72 Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1287, quoting Oxford English Dictionary (online ed 2017). 
 73 Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1287–88 (defining the term “position” as “[a] place where 
someone or something is located or has been put”), quoting Oxford English Dictionary 
(online ed 2017). 
 74 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A). 
 75 Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1285. 
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dissent in Archuleta offered a blistering criticism of the majority’s 
decision to equate “location” with “position” and concluded that, 
because any movement from “one’s precise spot” would satisfy the 
change in location requirement, the three-part test “is in fact 
standardless.”76 
C. Narrower Applications of the Robbery Abduction 
Enhancement 
The Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held 
that forced movement within a building does not constitute an 
abduction under the Guidelines, although the circuits have ap-
proached the issue differently. The Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits have left open the possibility of “different” locations ex-
isting within a building, although neither circuit has explained 
what it would require to hold that an abduction has occurred 
within a building. The Eighth Circuit explicitly applied the 
Seventh Circuit’s abduction holdings in a sexual assault case, but 
it does not appear that the Eighth Circuit has applied the abduc-
tion enhancement in the robbery context. Unlike other circuits 
that apply the robbery abduction enhancement, the Seventh 
Circuit looks to whether the offender engaged in the type of con-
duct “targeted by the abduction enhancement.”77 The Eleventh 
Circuit’s analysis focuses on the interpretation of the word “loca-
tion” and the need to differentiate between the physical restraint 
and abduction enhancements.78 
The Seventh Circuit has held on several occasions that forced 
movement within a building does not qualify for the robbery ab-
duction enhancement.79 In United States v Eubanks,80 the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed two abduction enhancements for rob-
beries allegedly committed by the same defendant—a jewelry 
store robbery that involved dragging a victim a distance of less 
than six feet into another room and a beauty store robbery that 
involved the offender forcing the victim into a separate room to 
 
 76 Id at 1294 (Seymour concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 77 United States v Eubanks, 593 F3d 645, 653 (7th Cir 2010), citing 
Osborne, 514 F3d at 390. 
 78 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1222–23. 
 79 See, for example, United States v Carter, 410 F3d 942, 956 (7th Cir 2005) (affirm-
ing physical restraint enhancement when a bank teller was forced from the bank vault to 
the teller counter); United States v Doubet, 969 F2d 341, 346 (7th Cir 1992) (affirming 
physical restraint enhancement when three bank tellers were forced into a small room in 
the back of the bank). 
 80 593 F3d 645 (7th Cir 2010). 
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retrieve a surveillance tape.81 The Seventh Circuit reversed the 
findings of the district court and held that the robbery abduction 
enhancement applied to neither crime.82 The Eubanks court de-
clined to explicitly denounce the Third Circuit’s approach in 
Osborne and instead argued that “the distance and nature of the 
confinements in [the] case were materially different than in 
Osborne.”83 The Eubanks court deemed the two instances under 
review not to constitute forced movement to a different location 
because of the distance covered and the intent behind the forced 
movement84—two elements that were left unaddressed by the 
Third and Tenth Circuits. 
Regarding the element of distance in Eubanks, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that “under [the] facts . . . transporting the vic-
tims from one room to another is simply not enough for abduction. 
To find otherwise would virtually ensure that any movement of a 
victim from one room to another within the same building . . . 
would result in an abduction enhancement.”85 
This appears directly at odds with the majority of the circuits, 
which have equated “location” with the more precise term “posi-
tion.”86 The Eubanks court noted that “there may well be situa-
tions in which an abduction enhancement is proper even though 
the victim remained within a single building,”87 but the court did 
not elaborate on how these situations might arise. Outside of the 
district court opinion that was overturned in Eubanks, I have not 
found any other district court within the Seventh Circuit that has 
applied the abduction enhancement to a robbery occurring within 
a single building. 
Unlike the majority of circuits, the Seventh Circuit also 
seems to define “location” with respect to what it perceives as the 
purpose of the robbery abduction enhancement: punishing the 
taking of hostages during a defendant’s escape. The Eubanks 
court concluded that neither of the robberies met the require-
ments to establish an abduction enhancement.88 In distinguishing 
Osborne, the Seventh Circuit stated, “[I]mportantly, the victims 
 
 81 Id at 652–53. 
 82 Id at 653. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Eubanks, 593 F3d at 653. 
 85 Id at 654. 
 86 See Part II.B. 
 87 Eubanks, 593 F3d at 654. 
 88 Id at 653. 
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in Osborne were essentially taken hostage to facilitate the defend-
ant’s escape—which is the type of conduct ‘plainly targeted by the 
abduction enhancement.’”89 Although courts often look to the 
scope of conduct targeted by the language of the abduction en-
hancement in the context of sexual assault cases,90 the approach 
in Eubanks appears unique in that the court seemingly required 
that the abduction occur with the purpose of facilitating the de-
fendant’s escape.91 Even though the Eubanks court did not explic-
itly hold that the absence of conduct targeted by the Guidelines 
would be enough to independently reject applying the robbery ab-
duction enhancement, the “importantly” language is telling. This 
language reveals that the Seventh Circuit limited the robbery ab-
duction enhancement by implicitly requiring that the enhance-
ment provision apply only to conduct targeted by the robbery ab-
duction enhancement—in this case, the taking of hostages. The 
Seventh Circuit appears to require more than just an intent to 
isolate or an act in furtherance of the crime, as both of these ele-
ments likely were met in both the jewelry store robbery and the 
beauty store robbery.92 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit did not 
provide any support for its assertion that the abduction enhance-
ment was created to target the taking of hostages as opposed to 
other actions.93 
Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has also 
repeatedly held that movement within a room or building does 
 
 89 Id, citing Osborne, 514 F3d at 390. 
 90 See, for example, United States v Saknikent, 30 F3d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir 1994) 
(determining that, because the application note uses the word “forcing,” the enhancement 
intended to target “those who isolate the very young and very vulnerable whose wills are 
either undeveloped or can be overcome with less than a full blown assault”). See also 
United States v Hefferon, 314 F3d 211, 226 (5th Cir 2002). 
 91 Along somewhat similar lines, the Osborne court rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment that “because he moved [the victims] toward their co-workers in the front of the store 
area, he did not engage in conduct that the abduction enhancement is designed to prevent: 
the isolation of his victims.” Osborne, 514 F3d at 390. The Osborne court concluded that 
“[the defendant] engaged in conduct plainly targeted by the abduction enhancement: keep-
ing victims close by as readily accessible hostages,” but this was not a key part of the 
Osborne court’s analysis. Id. In clarifying that the abduction enhancement applies to both 
threats and physical force, the Third Circuit also concluded that “the abduction enhance-
ment’s intention—at least in part—is to protect victims against additional harm that may 
come to them by virtue of their isolation.” Reynos, 680 F3d at 287. However, unlike the 
Eubanks court, the Third and Fourth Circuits did not state that the taking of hostages is 
a necessary, or even relevant, element in establishing that an abduction occurred. See id; 
Osborne, 514 F3d at 390. 
 92 See Eubanks, 593 F3d at 653. 
 93 See id. 
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not constitute an abduction.94 Although the Eleventh Circuit has 
“decline[d] to adopt a categorical rule,” the court in United States 
v Whatley95 concluded that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the term 
‘different location’ would not apply to each individual office or 
room in a local branch of a bank.”96 Instead of defining “location” 
in a vacuum, the Eleventh Circuit attempted to define “location” 
as it relates to the “ordinary understanding of the word ‘ab-
ducted.’”97 The Whatley court looked to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, which defines abduction as “led or carried away im-
properly, kidnapped”98 and to the Black’s Law Dictionary, which 
defines abduction as “[t]he act of leading someone away by force 
or fraudulent persuasion.”99 In applying these definitions, the 
court concluded, “An ordinary observer would conclude that [the 
offender] had taken the bank employees hostage during the com-
mission of the bank robberies, but would not describe those em-
ployees as having been abducted or kidnapped.”100 By treating the 
bank as a single location, the Eleventh Circuit essentially elected 
to define “location” as “place” instead of “position.”101 
The Whatley decision is unique among circuit decisions on the 
issue of abduction in that the court aimed to preserve the distinc-
tion between the physical restraint and abduction enhancements. 
The Whatley court reasoned that the two-level sentencing en-
hancement for physical restraint was warranted in another case 
“when the employees and customers of a credit union ‘were forced 
at gunpoint into the safe room and ordered to lie face down on the 
floor.’”102 The court concluded that, if the robbery abduction en-
hancement were applied too broadly, the wide-ranging interpreta-
tion would “blur the distinction between physical restraint and ab-
duction.”103 By establishing a higher standard for “different 
 
 94 See, for example, Whatley, 719 F3d at 1222. 
 95 719 F3d 1206 (11th Cir 2013). 
 96 Id at 1222. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id at 1222–23, quoting Oxford English Dictionary 14 (1961). 
 99 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1222–23, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 4 (West 9th ed 2009). 
 100 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1223. 
 101 See text accompanying notes 67–75 for the Tenth Circuit’s decision to define “lo-
cation” as “position.” 
 102 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1223, quoting United States v Jones, 32 F3d 1512, 1519 (11th 
Cir 1994). 
 103 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1223. 
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locations,” the Eleventh Circuit attempted to “preserve[ ] a dis-
tinction between the sentencing enhancement for physical re-
straint and the sentencing enhancement for abduction.”104 
The Eighth Circuit has adopted the Seventh Circuit’s 
abduction-related holdings, but only in some circumstances. 
Although the abduction enhancements for sexual assault and rob-
bery convictions stem from different provisions and are often 
treated differently,105 the Eighth Circuit accepted the Seventh 
Circuit’s limited interpretation of the robbery abduction enhance-
ment in a case involving a sexual assault.106 In United States v 
Strong,107 a sexual assault victim escaped the offender’s house but 
was later dragged back into the house.108 The Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that, “after [the victim] escaped, she was actually 
dragged to ‘a different location,’ not merely another room. Thus, 
the abduction enhancement was proper.”109 The Strong court 
cited Seventh Circuit case law in concluding that forced move-
ment from room to room does not constitute an abduction for pur-
poses of the sexual assault abduction enhancement, which also 
requires movement to a different location.110 The Eighth Circuit’s 
analysis on the issue is cursory at best, and it remains unclear 
whether the Eighth Circuit would extend this holding to the rob-
bery abduction enhancement. 
D. Flaws in the Circuits’ Approaches 
All of the circuits this Part discusses interpret and apply the 
robbery abduction enhancement in a flawed manner. The Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits use an overly flexible standard 
that allows for a high level of judicial discretion. Although the ap-
proaches used by the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits pro-
vide clear benefits, namely restrictions on judicial discretion, 
these circuits apply these heightened standards without formally 
rejecting the flexible standard of their sister circuits. 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Part III.B.1. 
 106 United States v Strong, 826 F3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir 2016). 
 107 826 F3d 1109 (8th Cir 2016). 
 108 Id at 1112. 
 109 Id at 1117. 
 110 Id, citing United States v Cooper, 360 Fed Appx 657, 659 (7th Cir 2010); § 2A3.1(b)(5). 
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1. The overly flexible analysis. 
The approaches used by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuits ensure that almost any movement can be labeled as a 
change in location due to the flexible standards articulated and 
the assertion that “position” is synonymous with “location.” These 
approaches fail to comply with the original purposes of the SRA111 
because these circuits expand, rather than cabin, judicial discre-
tion by allowing courts to rely on any one of a number of nonex-
clusive factors to justify applying the robbery abduction enhance-
ment.112 Furthermore, when the robbery abduction enhancement 
can theoretically apply to any forced movement, regardless of the 
distance involved or dangerousness of the underlying conduct, the 
sentences given for robbery convictions are no longer proportional 
to the crime committed. 
The flexible standard advocated by the Fifth Circuit in 
Hawkins113 and later affirmed by the Third,114 Fourth,115 and 
Tenth Circuits116 gives an enormous level of discretion to sentenc-
ing courts. By rejecting the “mechanical” application of exhaus-
tive factors in favor of “multiple interpretations,”117 the flexible 
approach allows courts to point to virtually any location-related 
factor as justification for determining that an abduction occurred. 
Under this analysis, courts can apply the robbery abduction en-
hancement to forced movement over virtually any distance de-
pending on how the court defines “location” or whether the 
offender forced the victim to cross a threshold.118 
Crucially, in determining whether an offender forced a victim 
to change location, these courts look to the “particular facts under 
scrutiny” instead of applying a static definition of location.119 For 
example, it would likely be consistent with the holdings in Hawkins 
and Osborne to apply the robbery abduction enhancement to forced 
movement between store aisles.120 Under the flexible analysis, a 
 
 111 See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1A3 at 1.2–
1.3 (1987). 
 112 See, for example, Osborne, 514 F3d at 390; Hawkins, 87 F3d at 727. 
 113 Hawkins, 87 F3d at 727. 
 114 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290. 
 115 Osborne, 514 F3d at 390. 
 116 Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1288. 
 117 Hawkins, 87 F3d at 728. 
 118 See notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 119 Hawkins, 87 F3d at 728. 
 120 See Osborne, 514 F3d at 389–90 (citing ordinary parlance and structures within 
the store as factors to be considered). 
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court may have a legal basis for holding that even forced move-
ment from the toothbrush section to the toothpaste section within 
the same aisle would qualify for an abduction enhancement. The 
court could justify its conclusion by reasoning that the store con-
tained many discrete locations or that the movement crossed an 
abstract threshold. Although these scenarios may appear hyper-
bolic, courts have affirmed abduction enhancements in cases in-
volving distances as short as “a few steps” under the flexible ap-
proach.121 At the same time, however, it is possible that courts 
could hold that a change in location did not occur—perhaps the 
store aisle or aisles could be described as part of the larger phar-
macy or merchandise sections. Without a clear method of deter-
mining when a change in location has occurred, courts within 
these circuits are able to reach different conclusions based on the 
same set of facts. The lack of clear boundaries under the flexible 
approach highlights the discretion inherent in the tests used by 
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. 
The inherent problems of the flexible test are most evident 
when courts equate “location” with “position,” as this allows al-
most any forced movement to meet the requisite standards for ap-
plying the robbery abduction enhancement.122 The almost auto-
matic application of the robbery abduction enhancement is clearly 
demonstrated by Hawkins. In Hawkins, the court found that the 
abduction enhancement applied to forced movement of “some 50 
to 60 feet” within a larger parking lot.123 It is important to note 
that there is almost an intuitive difference between the factual 
scenario mentioned in Hawkins and the Guidelines’ example of 
an abduction, in which the offender forcibly moved the victim 
using a getaway car.124 Unlike the fifty to sixty feet of movement 
in Hawkins, the use of a getaway car implies forced movement 
over a much greater distance. By trivializing the “different loca-
tion” requirement and bringing practically all forced movement 
within the reach of the robbery abduction enhancement, the flex-
ible approach may be fundamentally overinclusive, as courts ar-
guably have applied it to actions other than those targeted by the 
 
 121 See United States v Holiday, 582 Fed Appx 551, 551–52 (5th Cir 2014) (affirming 
abduction enhancement when the offender forced the victim into a separate room). See 
also United States v Styles, 659 Fed Appx 79, 84 (3d Cir 2016) (applying the abduction 
enhancement when “the victims . . . were moved from the first to the second floor of [a] 
residence”). 
 122 See Reynos, 680 F3d at 293–94 (Ambro dissenting). 
 123 Hawkins, 87 F3d at 726. 
 124 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A). 
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Guidelines.125 The dissent in Reynos echoed these concerns and 
argued that, by equating “location” with the more precise word 
“position,” this approach “‘virtually ensure[s]’ that any movement 
at all [ ] result[s] in an abduction enhancement.”126 
2. The ambiguous alternative. 
Despite the flaws of the flexible approach, the circuits that 
have rejected the flexible approach have failed to articulate a 
clear and workable alternative. Although the Seventh, Eighth, 
and Eleventh Circuits appear to require more than their sister 
circuits, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have refused to adopt 
a categorical rule.127 The Eighth Circuit, which appears to embrace 
the Seventh Circuit’s approach,128 likely also declines to adopt a 
categorical rule. Although the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have not offered a clear alternative to the flexible ap-
proach, when compared to their sister circuits, these circuits re-
quire a higher degree of forced movement before applying the rob-
bery abduction enhancement. Both the Seventh Circuit and 
Eleventh Circuit have proven hesitant to define “location” as “po-
sition”—justifying their interpretations with the need for a 
bright-line distinction129 and ordinary parlance.130 The Seventh 
Circuit has also sought to constrain the robbery abduction en-
hancement by limiting its application to hostage situations,131 
while the Eleventh Circuit has endeavored to constrain the rob-
bery abduction enhancement by drawing a bright line between 
the abduction and physical restraint enhancements.132 Although 
the constraints used by the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits are somewhat effective in reducing judicial discretion, 
these circuits would benefit from a categorical rule that crystal-
lizes their heightened standards and allows the circuits to apply 
the robbery abduction enhancement in a clearer, more consistent, 
and more uniform manner. 
 
 125 For a discussion of overinclusive statutes, see Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk 
Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, 1 Buff Crim L Rev 599, 604 (1998) (“[A] statute 
that is underinclusive is to be preferred to a statute that is overinclusive. . . . It is better 
to free ten guilty defendants than to punish one innocent defendant.”). 
 126 Reynos, 680 F3d at 293–94 (Ambro dissenting). 
 127 See Eubanks, 593 F3d at 654; Whatley, 719 F3d at 1222. 
 128 See Strong, 826 F3d at 1117. 
 129 Eubanks, 593 F3d at 654. 
 130 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1222. 
 131 Eubanks, 593 F3d at 653. 
 132 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1223. 
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III.  FINDING A UNIFYING DEFINITION OF LOCATION 
Before articulating an alternative to the flawed tests I de-
scribe in Part II.D, it is important to first note how a new solution 
could fulfill the purposes of the SRA.133 As I mention in Part II.A, 
the divergent approaches discussed throughout this Comment 
differ most significantly as to how to define the phrase “different 
location.”134 Any potential resolution must provide clear parame-
ters as to what constitutes a different location. A well-defined 
framework for applying the phrase “different location” could limit 
judicial discretion and ensure uniformity, two of the main purposes 
of the SRA.135 Furthermore, an alternative solution could ensure 
that the robbery abduction enhancement is applied in a manner 
that ensures proportionality—another key goal of the SRA.136 
This Comment seeks to provide a clear solution to the circuit 
split by offering a functional two-part test that achieves the SRA’s 
objectives. Part III.A draws a distinct line between the abduction 
and physical restraint enhancements set forth in USSG 
§ 2B3.1(b)(4). Part III.B presents a modified version of the intent-
based test that the Seventh Circuit advocates. This intent-based 
test ensures proportionality and that the robbery abduction en-
hancement targets only actions that expose the victim to danger. 
Part III.C proposes that “location” should be interpreted as 
“place” instead of “position,” which would effectively add a sub-
stantial distance requirement and cabin judicial discretion. Fi-
nally, Part III.D combines the prongs that Parts III.B and III.C 
propose and explains how this two-part balancing test would im-
prove the current state of the law. 
To clarify how the approaches in Parts III.B and III.C oper-
ate, this Comment applies each approach to the fact pattern in 
Reynos.137 Recall that, in Reynos, the defendant forced store em-
ployees to move from a locked bathroom, down a corridor, and into 
 
 133 Case law throughout the circuits strongly supports interpreting the SRA in light 
of its principal goals. See, for example, United States v Kirkpatrick, 589 F3d 414, 416 (7th 
Cir 2009) (“The Supreme Court has never questioned the principal goal of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984: to curtail the variable sentencing caused by different judges’ percep-
tions of the same criminal conduct. The allowable band of variance is greater after Booker 
than before, but intellectual discipline remains vital.”). 
 134 See notes 36–50 and accompanying text. 
 135 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1A3 at 1.2–1.3 (1987). 
 136 Id. 
 137 See notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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a room containing a cash register.138 The employees moved be-
tween thirty-four and thirty-nine feet during the episode.139 
A. Defining the Boundaries of Abduction and Physical 
Restraint 
Before delving into the two elements of the proposed balanc-
ing test, it is worth noting the importance of differentiating be-
tween the abduction and physical restraint enhancements. Be-
cause an abduction under the Guidelines is essentially physical 
restraint plus forced movement to a different location,140 the defi-
nition of location that courts apply determines the boundaries be-
tween the two enhancements. Unless courts clearly state how to 
determine a “change in location,” the two enhancements risk be-
coming identical in application.141 
1. Overly punitive enhancements in the Guidelines. 
As Part II.D.1 explains, the majority of circuits interpret “lo-
cation” and “abduction” so that they may apply the robbery ab-
duction enhancement in virtually any situation involving forced 
movement. Furthermore, because an offender forcibly moving a 
victim is likely relatively common in robberies, most circuits 
transform the robbery abduction enhancement into an almost 
universal sentencing enhancement.142 Instead of enhancing the 
base sentence in only some circumstances, the enhancement in-
creases the recommended sentence for all robberies with forced 
movement over virtually any distance. This application is overly 
 
 138 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See United States v Fisher, 132 F3d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir 1997) (describing the 
physical restraint enhancement); USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A). 
 141 See Whatley, 719 F3d at 1223. 
 142 See Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1294 (Seymour concurring in part and dissenting in 
part): 
[T]he majority’s “flexible standard” is in fact standardless. Accordingly, it ap-
pears that the only way a person could receive an enhancement for physical re-
straint while not being eligible for an abduction enhancement is if all of his vic-
tims remain perfectly still throughout the entire robbery. This is an absurd 
result. 
See also People v Daniels, 459 P2d 225, 234 (Cal 1969) (“[W]e now recognize that some 
brief movements are necessarily incidental to the crime of armed robbery.”). It is im-
portant to note that, under the flexible approach adopted by the majority of circuits, courts 
do theoretically retain some discretion in applying the robbery abduction enhancement. 
In practice, however, it appears that courts treat the enhancement more akin to a manda-
tory sentencing enhancement applicable in virtually all cases involving movement. 
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punitive for two reasons: the enhancement is fundamentally over-
inclusive when it applies to almost any robbery offense; and when 
applied to those offenses, the sentence becomes disproportional to 
the underlying conduct. Courts have generally felt uneasy about 
interpreting sentencing enhancement provisions in this overly 
broad manner, as these interpretations ensure that the Guidelines 
are universally applied in a manner disproportional to the crime 
committed.143 When faced with an overly punitive interpretation of 
the Guidelines, courts have often rejected such an interpretation.144 
One of the best examples of courts rejecting an overly puni-
tive application of the Guidelines is courts applying the child por-
nography Guidelines provisions in USSG § 2G2.2.145 Congress has 
not updated the Guidelines provisions for nonproduction child 
pornography offenses in almost a decade, and changes in technol-
ogy, “such as the widespread use of peer-to-peer [ ] file sharing,” 
often trigger “multiple guideline enhancements” in “the vast ma-
jority” of cases.146 For example, the Guidelines provide for a two-
level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved the use of a computer 
or an interactive computer service for the possession, transmis-
sion, receipt, or distribution of the material, or for accessing with 
intent to view the material.”147 However, modern possession or 
distribution of child pornography almost always involves a com-
puter or interactive device—which means that this technology en-
hancement provision applies in virtually all child pornography 
cases.148 Because of the potential for overly punitive applications 
 
 143 See, for example, United States v Grober, 595 F Supp 2d 382, 384 (D NJ 2008) 
(“[W]hen . . . the guidelines for a defendant entering a plea is just months shy of the 20 
year statutory maximum, one gets busy asking questions about how that happened. This 
Court has asked itself: Am I working with a rational sentencing structure, or administer-
ing the Code of Hammurabi?”). 
 144 See, for example, id (“[T]he Court has concluded that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2[ ] fails to 
provide a just and reasoned sentencing range given the facts of this case and the back-
ground of the defendant. As a consequence the Court has significantly varied downward 
in sentencing [the defendant].”). 
 145 This Comment focuses on the technology enhancement for child pornography, but 
the Supreme Court has held that courts may also categorically disagree with the 
Guidelines in cases involving crack cocaine sentencing enhancements. Kimbrough v 
United States, 552 US 85, 110 (2007). 
 146 2012 Report to the Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offenses *207 (United 
States Sentencing Commission, Dec 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/558C-XHZR. 
 147 USSG § 2G2.2(b)(6). 
 148 Grober, 595 F Supp 2d at 397 (“[The government’s witness] testified that every one 
of the cases she had worked on—‘100 percent’—‘involved the use of a computer and of 
interactive computer service.’”). 
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of these sentencing enhancements, circuits have held that “dis-
trict courts may vary from the child pornography Guidelines [ ] 
based on policy disagreement[s].”149 
Because the robbery abduction enhancement could apply in 
almost any situation involving forced movement if “change in lo-
cation” is defined broadly, the robbery abduction enhancement 
bears many similarities to the child pornography technology en-
hancement. Just as technology is a common component of most 
child pornography crimes, forced movement is a common compo-
nent of many robberies. Essentially, the universal application of 
the robbery abduction enhancement ensures that the robbery ab-
duction enhancement is applied in a disproportional manner, 
thwarting one of the main objectives of the SRA.150 The similari-
ties to other overly punitive interpretations should provide courts 
with an independent reason to reject the approaches used by the 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. It is worth noting that 
the argument that § 2G2.2 is overly punitive arose due to evolving 
technology, whereas the differentiation between the physical re-
straint and abduction enhancements has not been affected by 
changing societal forces or technology. But this distinction is 
likely not highly relevant as both involve enhancements that may 
apply in virtually all cases. 
2. Establishing boundaries. 
Similar to USSG § 2G2.2, the robbery abduction enhancement 
also faces issues of overinclusivity. As Part II.C discusses, the dis-
sent in Eubanks voiced the concern that a broad interpretation of 
“different location” would “virtually ensure that any movement at 
all [ ] result[s] in an abduction enhancement.”151 Essentially, inter-
preting “different location” broadly allows the abduction enhance-
ment to supplant the physical restraint enhancement.152 
 
 149 See, for example, United States v Henderson, 649 F3d 955, 963 (9th Cir 2011). See 
also United States v Grober, 624 F3d 592, 609 (3d Cir 2010) (“Here, after extensive considera-
tion of § 2G2.2 and the § 3553(a) factors, the District Court determined not to apply the 
Guidelines range recommended by § 2G2.2. This was not an abuse of its discretion.”); Sarah 
Einhorn, Case Summary, United States v. Henderson: Child Pornography Sentencing 
Guidelines Subject to Challenge on Public Policy Grounds, 42 Golden Gate U L Rev 127, 133–
35 (2011). 
 150 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1A3 at 1.2 (1987). 
 151 See note 85 and accompanying text. 
 152 As Parts II.A and II.B address, the flexible approach endows courts with an enor-
mous degree of judicial discretion. In practice, however, it appears that the majority of 
circuits apply the abduction enhancement in virtually all robbery cases involving forced 
movement. 
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The two-level physical restraint enhancement provision in 
USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) is separated from the four-level robbery 
abduction enhancement provision in USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) by 
the word “or,”153 which suggests that a distinction exists between 
the two provisions. In practice, courts have held that the physical 
restraint enhancement targets behavior that keeps a victim from 
moving, while the abduction enhancement targets behavior that 
forces a victim to change location.154 Courts have consistently re-
jected double counting claims (applying two mutually exclusive 
provisions to the same conduct),155 and there are some situations 
in which a defendant’s conduct may trigger both enhancements. 
For example, the Sixth Circuit applied both enhancements when 
an offender restrained some victims at one location and abducted 
other victims during the same robbery.156 Outside of these limited 
situations in which the crime warrants applying both enhance-
ments, application of an overly broad abduction enhancement 
merges the two enhancements. Because a change in the victim’s 
location is the essential difference between the two enhance-
ments, a lower barrier for finding that a change in location has 
occurred effectively merges the two enhancements. The Eleventh 
Circuit in particular has noted that applying the robbery abduc-
tion enhancement to conduct that is covered under the physical 
restraint enhancement would “blur the distinction between phys-
ical restraint and abduction.”157 However, alternatives exist, such 
as the balancing test that Part III.C discusses. 
B. The “Dangerousness” Test 
As I mention above, the Seventh Circuit in Eubanks looked 
to the purpose of the “abduction” enhancement and held that this 
purpose would be met if the victims “were essentially taken hos-
tage to facilitate the defendant’s escape.”158 Despite the Eubanks 
court’s determination that the purpose of the robbery abduction 
enhancement was “important” in differentiating the facts under 
review from Osborne, the Eubanks court did not elucidate this 
line of analysis.159 Perhaps most remarkably, the Seventh Circuit 
 
 153 See notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 154 See, for example, United States v Gall, 116 F3d 228, 230 (7th Cir 1997). 
 155 See, for example, Strong, 826 F3d at 1116–17. 
 156 Id at 1117, citing United States v Smith, 320 F3d 647, 658 (6th Cir 2003). 
 157 Whatley, 719 F3d at 1223. 
 158 Eubanks, 593 F3d at 653. 
 159 Id. 
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did not substantiate its claim that the robbery abduction en-
hancement was created to target hostage taking.160 Unfortu-
nately, there appears to be no legislative history or other guidance 
that can shed light on the purpose of the abduction enhancement 
as applied to robberies.161 However, an abundance of case law ex-
ists on abduction enhancements as applied to sexual assault cases 
through the sexual assault abduction provision in § 2A3.1(b)(5). 
Because the sexual abuse abduction enhancement in 
§ 2A3.1(b)(5) and the robbery abduction enhancement in 
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) both use the term “abducted” and require that 
the victim was forcibly moved to a different location,162 case law 
on the sexual assault abduction enhancement can shed light on 
how the robbery abduction enhancement should be applied. Fur-
thermore, although the circuit courts disagree about how to inter-
pret this language in the robbery context, there appears to be 
more of a consensus on how to apply the abduction enhancement 
in the sexual assault context.163 This Section describes how courts 
apply the sexual assault abduction provision and also the ad-
vantages of this application. 
1. Defining “forced movement” using sexual assault case 
law. 
The Guidelines provide a four-level sentencing enhancement 
“if the victim was abducted” during a sexual assault.164 The appli-
cation notes for abduction enhancements in sexual assault cases 
 
 160 Although the Eubanks court did cite a passage in Osborne that concluded the ab-
duction enhancement targets hostage taking, the Eubanks court left out the Osborne 
court’s broader holding that “the abduction enhancement is intended, at least in part, to 
protect victims against the additional harm that may result from being forced to accom-
pany an offender, such as being taken as a hostage during a robbery or being isolated to 
prolong a sexual assault.” Osborne, 514 F3d at 387. The Seventh Circuit may have come 
to a different conclusion if it had applied the broader analysis from Osborne. The harm-
based analysis in Osborne is substantially similar to the dangerousness test this Part ad-
vocates—although this Part goes a step further by defining the potential of harm to the 
victim as an element of an abduction. 
 161 There is some literature on the types of behavior targeted by kidnapping statutes. 
See, for example, John L. Diamond, Kidnapping: A Modern Definition, 13 Am J Crim L 1, 
25–34 (1985) (discussing various actions that kidnapping statutes could target, including 
conduct that reduces the possibility of detection or poses additional harm to the victim). 
 162 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A). 
 163 For a representative application of the abduction enhancement in the sexual as-
sault context, see United States v Kills in Water, 293 F3d 432, 437 (8th Cir 2002). 
 164 Id at 436–37. 
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refer to the same definition of abduction as the abduction en-
hancements for robbery.165 As Part I.B discusses, the Guidelines 
note that the definition of “abduct[ion]” is met if “a victim was 
forced to accompany an offender to a different location.”166 Essen-
tially, the definition of abduction requires forced movement plus 
a change in location. 
Courts have often applied abduction enhancements in sexual 
assault cases. In these cases, the courts have concluded that the 
abduction enhancement is intended, in part, to protect the victim 
from the additional risks that may occur during an abduction.167 
Courts have used the rationale behind the sexual assault abduc-
tion enhancement to interpret the abduction enhancement—and 
the phrase “forced movement” in particular.168 Instead of looking 
to a “change in location” as the most important element in an ab-
duction, courts instead focus on whether the victim was exposed 
to additional harm during the forced movement.169 These courts 
still examine whether the offender forced the victim to change lo-
cation,170 but generally this analysis is very limited.171 This 
Comment refers to the analysis of whether the defendant’s ac-
tions increased the risk the victims faced as the dangerousness 
test. 
It does not appear that courts have grappled with defining 
“different location” in sexual assault cases to the same degree as 
courts in robbery cases. Instead, these courts usually focus on 
whether the movement to a “different location” increased the like-
lihood of harm befalling the victim.172 In fact, courts have often 
found that abductions occurring over very short distances have 
 
 165 USSG § 2A3.1, Application Note 1. 
 166 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A). 
 167 See, for example, United States v Saknikent, 30 F3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir 1994) 
(“[A]bduction increases the gravity of sexual assault or other crimes because the perpetra-
tor’s ability to isolate the victim increases the likelihood that the victim will be harmed.”). 
 168 See United States v Kavo, 128 Fed Appx 447, 450–51 (6th Cir 2005) (interpreting 
the word “forced” in light of whether “movement of the victim increased the likelihood of 
harm”). 
 169 See, for example, Kills in Water, 293 F3d at 437 (“We will uphold a § 2A3.1(b)(5) 
enhancement for an abduction in situations where ‘the perpetrator’s ability to isolate the 
victim increases the likelihood that the victim will be harmed.’”) (citations omitted). 
 170 See, for example, United States v Young, 50 Fed Appx 334, 334 (8th Cir 2002) 
(“Moving a victim from one location to another meets the definition of abduction.”). 
 171 See, for example, Kills in Water, 293 F3d at 437 (requiring only forced movement 
to a “physically close location” for the change in location requirement to be satisfied). But 
see, for example, Strong, 826 F3d at 1117 (holding that “dragging a victim from one room 
to another is not abduction”). 
 172 Kills in Water, 293 F3d at 437 (quotation marks omitted). 
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satisfied the dangerousness test for purposes of the sexual assault 
provisions in the Guidelines. For example, in United States v Kills 
in Water,173 the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether an abduction en-
hancement should be applied when a defendant allegedly forcibly 
moved the victim from the outside of a trailer to the inside of a 
trailer prior to a sexual assault.174 The Eighth Circuit concluded 
that the abduction enhancement applied because, under the dan-
gerousness test, “[the] defendant’s ability to isolate the victim in-
side the trailer certainly increased the likelihood of harm to the 
victim.”175 
Notably, the Kills in Water court analyzed the commentary’s 
example of an offender forcing a victim into a getaway car176 and 
concluded that “abduction occurs when a bank robber forces a vic-
tim of the robbery to another, physically close location, where the 
victim’s ability to escape is impaired.”177 Although distance is not 
a component of the dangerousness test espoused by the Eighth 
Circuit, the Eighth Circuit’s total rejection of any distance ele-
ment may be misplaced—a stationary trailer is actually very dif-
ferent from the mobile getaway car example used in the commen-
tary. This distinction was likely not lost on those drafting the 
commentary to the Guidelines, especially when a stationary loca-
tion could have been used instead of a vehicle to furnish an exam-
ple. It is likely that the commentary meant to imply that the vic-
tim in the getaway car example will be taken to a different 
location—the movement from outside the car to inside the car in-
stead constitutes an incomplete abduction. Otherwise, the draft-
ers could have chosen a clearer example without the implication 
of additional movement associated with a vehicular abduction. 
Why does this distinction matter? Despite the Eighth 
Circuit’s prompt conclusion that nothing more than movement to 
“another, physically close location” is necessary in establishing an 
 
 173 293 F3d 432 (8th Cir 2002). 
 174 Id at 437. 
 175 Id. See also Kavo, 128 Fed Appx at 451: 
[B]ecause Kavo physically carried [the victim], against her wishes . . . the dis-
trict court held that Kavo had abducted his victim within the meaning of the 
sentencing guidelines and was thus deserving of the four-level enhancement. . . . 
We agree with the district court’s decision that the movement of the victim in-
creased the likelihood of harm and offered Kavo a better chance to consummate 
his crime. 
 176 USSG § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(A) (“[A] bank robber’s forcing a bank teller from 
the bank into a getaway car would constitute an abduction.”). 
 177 Kills in Water, 293 F3d at 437. 
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abduction,178 the dangerousness test does not speak to whether 
the movement constituted a change in location. Instead, it looks 
only to whether forced movement occurred. As an alternative, 
courts could apply the dangerousness test to determine if the 
movement was forced while using a separate test to determine 
whether the offender moved the victim to a different location. Be-
cause the definition of an abduction requires both forced move-
ment and a change in location, this alternative is well-suited to 
use a two-pronged test or a two-part balancing test to incorporate 
both elements of the definition of abduction. 
2. Applying a modified “dangerousness” test. 
If the Reynos court were to apply the dangerousness test de-
scribed above, it likely would have found that forcing employees 
to move from the bathroom to the cash register fails the danger-
ousness test—that is, it did not merit the robbery abduction en-
hancement. To begin with, although the employees were held at 
gunpoint, the actual movement from the bathroom to the cash 
register may not have added any more dangerousness than if the 
employees were being robbed within a single location. The em-
ployees were not isolated. In other words, the movement, or the 
“abduction,” may not have added an element of danger. Viewed in 
this light, the employees are subject to a similar level of danger 
as if they were held up during a simple store robbery. Applying 
the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the sexual assault abduc-
tion provision, § 2A3.1(b)(5), to this fact pattern, it would be un-
likely that a court would apply the abduction enhancement be-
cause there was no “isolat[ion] [of] the victim [that] increase[d] 
the likelihood that the victim [would] be harmed.”179 However, as 
I discuss below, sexual assault case law involving isolation may 
be of limited utility. 
The dangerousness approach this Section describes offers 
several key advantages over any of the current methods the cir-
cuits use. First, the dangerousness test is more likely to target 
traditional abduction actions. By looking to the effects of move-
ment forced on the victim rather than the movement itself, this test 
likely resolves any problems of overinclusion. Instead of applying 
the abduction enhancement to almost any forced movement, the 
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 179 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
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dangerousness test ensures that the abduction enhancement tar-
gets conduct that is harmful to the victim. For cases in which the 
victim’s forced movement fails the dangerousness test, courts 
could still apply the physical restraint enhancement to the of-
fender’s sentence. Restricting application of the abduction en-
hancement in this limited manner ensures the proportionality of 
the enhancement—one of the key goals of the SRA.180 Second, the 
dangerousness test is particularly appropriate in the abduction 
context because the dangerousness test targets behavior that de-
creases the probability of detection, which also decreases the cost 
to the offender of committing the crime.181 Lastly, this test incor-
porates existing sexual assault case law applying the abduction 
enhancement—case law that has already resolved many ques-
tions of application. Courts can draw directly from this case law, 
which would reduce uncertainty and judicial discretion because 
many of these issues have already been settled. 
However, the dangerousness test may allow judges more dis-
cretion in some situations as the dangerousness test is more of a 
standard than a rule.182 It is plausible that almost any forced 
movement could be characterized as increasing the level of dan-
ger to the victim by virtue of the movement being forced. For ex-
ample, moving a victim several feet at gunpoint could arguably 
increase the risk of injury to the victim because the victim would 
have an opportunity to resist and an injury may result. In these 
situations, courts may have to determine how much danger is suf-
ficient to satisfy the dangerousness test. Courts could come to ten-
able disagreements on this matter. 
Furthermore, case law applying § 2A3.1(b)(5) may offer little 
guidance in these situations as isolation often satisfies the dan-
gerousness test if it precedes a sexual assault. Courts often find 
that isolation is sufficient to satisfy the dangerousness test be-
cause the isolation can give the offender “a better chance to con-
summate his [or her] crime” or create an additional risk of harm 
to the victim.183 However, the element of isolation is less probative 
 
 180 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1A3 at 1.2 (1987). 
 181 This functional analysis is very similar to ideas raised by Jeremy Bentham. See 
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 184 (Clarendon 
1879) (“To enable the value of the punishment to outweigh that of the profit of the offense, it 
must be increased, in point of magnitude, in proportion as it falls short in point of certainty.”). 
 182 See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 NYU L Rev 383, 415 (2007) (“The 
classic debate over rules versus standards is in large part a disagreement about the 
amount of discretion appropriately given to lower courts.”). 
 183 Kavo, 128 Fed Appx at 451. 
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in the context of robbery. Although it is possible for isolation to 
come before a successful robbery,184 hostage situations often occur 
after completion of the robbery, frequently with the purpose of 
destroying evidence185 or facilitating the offender’s escape.186 Ad-
ditionally, unlike sexual assault cases, which often involve only 
one victim, many robberies with an abduction component involve 
multiple victims.187 However, some of these issues are mitigated 
by implementing the dangerousness test alongside a substantial 
distance requirement, which the next Section develops. 
C. The Substantial Distance Test 
Currently, no court has adopted an explicit substantial dis-
tance requirement for abduction enhancements under the 
Guidelines. However, courts could look to legal authorities on kid-
napping from sources outside of the Guidelines.188 Drawing on 
these sources could help to define what “abduction” means within 
the robbery abduction enhancement.189 These sources could in-
clude the Model Penal Code190 (MPC) and kidnapping case law at 
the state level.191 Although these sources treat kidnapping as a 
separate crime from robbery and not as an enhancement in the 
sentencing phase, these sources have dealt with similar issues of 
proportionality and uniformity. 
 
 184 See, for example, Reynos, 680 F3d at 288. 
 185 See, for example, Eubanks, 593 F3d at 652–53. 
 186 See, for example, Whatley, 719 F3d at 1210 (“Whatley ushered the employees to 
the windowless men’s bathroom, and Whatley pushed a folding table up in front of the 
door and told the employees to wait 15 minutes to exit. He left the bank.”). 
 187 See, for example, id. 
 188 Looking to the general landscape of a legal doctrine in order to better understand 
and apply certain provisions is not a unique approach. For a justification of this technique, 
see generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard 1982). 
Furthermore, courts have dealt with nearly identical issues to those this Comment raises 
in the context of criminal kidnapping. See People v Tanner, 44 P2d 324, 330–32 (Cal 1935) 
(examining common law definition of kidnapping to interpret a subsequently enacted kid-
napping statute). 
 189 There is little legislative history or direct commentary to assist in divining the 
important terms in the robbery abduction enhancement. However, it is relatively common 
for courts to give weight to common usages when interpreting vague terms. See, for exam-
ple, Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 21 (1999) (“[When] Congress uses terms that have 
accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the 
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning 
of those terms.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 190 MPC § 212.1 (ALI 1962). 
 191 See Virgin Islands v Berry, 604 F2d 221, 227 (3d Cir 1979) (describing the law of 
kidnapping in various states). 
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Although the robbery abduction enhancement was created by 
the United States Sentencing Commission, courts often look to 
existing common law doctrines when interpreting sentencing 
guidelines.192 This Section looks to kidnapping case law in order 
to better comprehend the robbery abduction provision. 
1. Defining “location” using state law. 
While “[t]he traditional rule in American jurisprudence was 
that any asportation—i.e., carrying away—of the victim, no mat-
ter how short in distance or duration, was sufficient to establish 
the crime of kidnapping,” a series of state court decisions in the 
1960s and 1970s “severely [limited] the scope of [ ] state kidnap-
ping statutes.”193 State courts have used a variety of methods to 
limit the doctrine to cases involving genuine kidnapping instead of 
lesser crimes, such as false imprisonment.194 For reasons of clarity 
and uniformity, this Comment focuses on states that have insti-
tuted a substantial distance requirement, such as California,195 
while generally avoiding discussion of states that have not insti-
tuted such a requirement.196 However, it is worth noting that 
many of the states that have not instituted a substantial distance 
requirement have instead applied alternative limiting doctrines. 
For example, the New York Court of Appeals settled on a merger 
doctrine of sorts by limiting kidnapping convictions to instances 
in which the ultimate crime (for example, robbery or sexual as-
sault) “could not be committed in the forms planned without the 
limited asportations [ ] involved.”197 
Courts in states that adopted a distance requirement predom-
inantly have based their decisions on “[t]he inequity inherent in 
 
 192 United States v Rodriguez, 711 F3d 541, 549–52 (5th Cir 2013) (listing circuits 
that have used common law meanings to define offense categories in the Guidelines). 
 193 Berry, 604 F2d at 225–26. 
 194 See Wesley M. Oliver, Charles Lindbergh, Caryl Chessman, and the Exception 
Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 Berkeley J 
Crim L 1, 42–56 (2015) (analyzing the Caryl Chessman kidnapping case and different lim-
iting approaches used by states). This perceived need to differentiate between false im-
prisonment and kidnapping echoes the need to distinguish between the physical restraint 
and abduction enhancements that Part III.A describes. 
 195 See United States v Sanchez, 782 F Supp 94, 97 (CD Cal 1992). 
 196 See, for example, State v Salamon, 949 A2d 1092, 1111 (Conn 2008) (“[B]ecause 
the statutory definitions of the terms ‘restrain’ and ‘abduct’ contain no time or distance 
specifications, the offense of kidnapping does not require proof that the victim was con-
fined for any minimum period of time or moved any minimum distance.”). 
 197 People v Miles, 245 NE2d 688, 694 (NY 1969). 
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permitting kidnapping prosecutions of those who in reality com-
mitted lesser or different offenses, of which temporary seizure or 
detention played an incidental part.”198 For example, the California 
Supreme Court concluded that “incidental movements are not of 
the scope intended by the Legislature in prescribing the asporta-
tion element of [aggravated kidnapping].”199 The Third Circuit 
surveyed substantial distance tests and determined that 
four factors are central to each of these approaches. Those 
factors are: (1) the duration of the detention or asportation; 
(2) whether the detention or asportation occurred during the 
commission of a separate offense; (3) whether the detention 
or asportation which occurred is inherent in the separate 
offense; and (4) whether the asportation or detention created 
a significant danger to the victim independent of that posed 
by the separate offense.200 
Only the first and fourth elements are relevant to this Comment. 
The MPC has unambiguously instituted a distance or tem-
poral requirement in kidnapping cases that do not involve re-
moval from a home or business. For the state to secure a convic-
tion under the MPC, the state must show that the defendant 
unlawfully removed a person “from his place of residence or busi-
ness, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found, 
or . . . unlawfully confine[d] [that person] for a substantial period 
in a place of isolation.”201 In drafting the MPC, the authors noted 
that, under the traditional rule, even minor asportation can lead 
to a kidnapping conviction and “[t]he criminologically non-
significant circumstance that the victim was detained or moved 
incident to the crime determines whether the offender lives or 
dies.”202 Because the MPC uses “the word ‘vicinity’ rather than 
‘place’ and [ ] requir[es] substantial removal, the section makes 
clear the purpose to preclude kidnapping convictions based on 
trivial changes of location having no bearing on the evil at 
 
 198 Berry, 604 F2d at 226. See also id at 226–27 (“In sum, the modern approach is to 
construe the kidnapping statutes so as ‘to prevent gross distortion of lesser crimes into a 
much more serious crime by excess of prosecutorial zeal.’”) (citation omitted); People v 
Levy, 204 NE2d 842, 844 (NY 1965) (“It is a common occurrence in robbery, for example, 
that the victim be confined briefly at gunpoint or bound and detained, or moved into and 
left in another room or place.”). 
 199 People v Daniels, 459 P2d 225, 234 (Cal 1969). 
 200 Berry, 604 F2d at 226–27. 
 201 MPC § 212.1 (ALI 1962). 
 202 Model Penal Code: Tentative Draft No 11 14 (ALI Apr 27, 1960). 
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hand.”203 In fact, the the MPC drafters were clear that they 
wanted to “eliminate[ ] the absurdity of prosecuting for kidnap-
ping in cases where the victim is forced . . . to the back of his store 
in the course of a robbery.”204 The “substantial removal” require-
ment likely is doing more of the heavy lifting under the MPC 
when compared to the MPC’s use of the word “vicinity” rather 
than “place.” This is because the definition of the word “vicinity” 
is similar to that of “place.”205 
Courts have elected to define the substantiality requirement 
not in terms of a bright-line distance but rather in terms of the 
combination of “duration, distance, and [ ] change in environ-
ment.”206 Courts have found that the substantiality requirement 
may be met in certain instances over short distances, but these 
cases are usually limited to situations in which the forced move-
ment leads to a change in environment. This change in environ-
ment element often informs what constitutes “substantially” in-
stead of a concrete distance requirement.207 
These courts define location as “place” instead of “position.” 
For example, in Virgin Islands v Alment,208 the Third Circuit 
looked to whether the forcible dragging of a sexual assault victim 
approximately seventy feet “from a lighted interior office . . . into 
a dark area of bushes” met the dangerousness test and the re-
quirement of substantiality.209 Despite the short distance in-
volved, the duration of the asportation “lasted, at a minimum . . . 
fifteen minutes, to a maximum of forty-five minutes to one 
hour.”210 The court determined that the forcible dragging, and the 
physical harm that resulted, satisfied the dangerousness test, 
while the “duration” and “shift in environment” met the substan-
tiality requirement.211 Similarly, another Third Circuit case de-
termined that forcibly dragging a minor “eighty-eight feet. . . . 
through the bushes into [a neighbor’s] house” to perpetrate a 
sexual assault met the sufficient distance requirement because 
 
 203 Id at 16. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See Oxford English Dictionary “vicinity,” online at http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/223177 (visited Oct 27, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (defining “vicinity” as 
“[t]he state, character, or quality of being near in space”). 
 206 Sanchez, 782 F Supp at 97. 
 207 See Daniels, 459 P2d at 229–30. 
 208 820 F2d 635 (3d Cir 1987). 
 209 Id at 640. 
 210 Id at 638. 
 211 Id. 
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“pulling [the victim] away from the place where she was playing” 
constituted a change in environment.”212 By requiring a change in 
environment, these courts are essentially requiring a change in 
“place” rather than a change in “position.” 
2. “Place” versus “position” in light of the Guidelines. 
Although courts have not adopted an explicit substantial 
distance requirement for abduction enhancements under the 
Guidelines, debate over whether “location” should be defined as 
“position” or “place” looks to fundamentally the same issue.213 De-
fining “location” as “position” would allow courts to apply the rob-
bery abduction enhancement even over a comparatively short dis-
tance, while defining “location” as “place” would limit courts to 
applying the robbery abduction enhancement only if the victim 
was forcibly moved from a comparatively larger area.214 The im-
portance of this distinction arises from the more exact definition 
of position215 as opposed to the more imprecise definition of 
place.216 This Comment advocates for defining “location” as 
“place” instead of “position.” Doing so essentially would institute 
an implied substantial distance requirement. 
Part of the justification for an implied substantial distance re-
quirement can be found in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ analyses. 
Instead of applying “ordinary parlance” to determine “different 
location[s]” as the phrase relates to abductions, these circuits de-
fined “a different location” in the abstract.217 By examining the 
 
 212 Virgin Islands v Ventura, 775 F2d 92, 94–98 (3d Cir 1985) (emphasis added). 
 213 See Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1288 (adopting the definition of position); Hawkins, 87 
F3d at 727 (adopting a similar definition of point); Whatley, 719 F3d at 1222 (concluding, 
consistent with an adoption of the “place” definition, that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the 
term ‘different location’ would not apply to each individual office or room in a local branch 
of a bank”). 
 214 See Archuleta, 865 F3d at 1287–88 (discussing definitions of location, position, and 
place). 
 215 Oxford English Dictionary “position,” online at http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/148314 (visited Oct 27, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (defining “position” as 
“[a] place in which a person, thing, etc., is located or has been put”). 
 216 Oxford English Dictionary “place,” online at http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/144864 (visited Oct 27, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (defining “place” as “[a] 
building, establishment, or area devoted to a particular purpose”). 
 217 Hawkins, 87 F3d at 727 (quotation marks omitted); Osborne, 514 F3d at 389 (quo-
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phrase “different location” in a vacuum, courts have reached con-
clusions that are likely inconsistent with how “different location” 
would be interpreted by the general public in abduction cases.218 
3. Applying a substantial distance requirement. 
Although this Comment recommends a two-part balancing 
test that looks to both dangerousness and distance, for purposes 
of demonstration, this Section applies the substantial distance re-
quirement to the facts of Reynos without any elements of the dan-
gerousness test. 
If a substantial distance requirement were required in Reynos, 
the court likely would have held that the robbery abduction en-
hancement was inapplicable. Because the victim in Reynos was 
transported only thirty-four to thirty-nine feet,219 the forced move-
ment would almost certainly not qualify as “substantial.”220 In-
stead, the movement in Reynos, which occurred within a building, 
would fail the substantiality requirement because the movement 
transpired within a single “environment” or “place.” However, if 
the facts were changed so that the forced movement of forty feet 
or so happened from building A, into an outside area, and into 
adjacent building B, courts may find that the substantiality re-
quirement is met. In this alternative fact pattern, the victim is 
moved from “one building or area used for a specific purpose or 
activity” into another “building or area used for a specific purpose 
or activity”221—changing one environment for another. Although 
it is possible that some courts may try to interpret an environ-
ment or “an area used for a specific purpose or activity” to include 
smaller locations,222 state courts have repeatedly required more 
 
 218 See Alexander T. Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev 20, 
35 (1988) (“The Legal Process makes clear that the adjudicator is not simply charged with 
analyzing the case in light of the particular purpose behind a particular statute. . . . The 
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 219 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290. 
 220 See, for example, People v Brown, 523 P2d 226, 229 (Cal 1974) (“Defendant [ ] 
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 221 See note 216 and accompanying text. 
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than movement within a building or confined area when applying 
the substantiality requirement.223 As Part III.C.1 discusses, the 
substantiality requirement does not look only to distance at the 
exclusion of other factors but to a combination of “duration, dis-
tance, and [ ] change in environment.”224 
Implementing a substantial distance requirement would 
first and foremost provide a means to curtail judicial discretion 
when applying the robbery abduction enhancement under the 
Guidelines. Courts could draw from decades of judicial kidnap-
ping precedent to apply a uniform definition of location. The 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ flexible approach and the Third and 
Tenth Circuits’ relatively toothless three-part test would be re-
placed with a much clearer standard rooted in case law. Although 
the substantial distance test described in this Section allows 
courts some discretion in determining its applicability, the sub-
stantial distance test cabins discretion compared to the majority 
approach. If the substantial distance test were adopted, these 
circuits would be bound by decades of precedent on how to de-
termine a change in location and could not define “location” flex-
ibly. Although it is likely that adopting a substantiality require-
ment would not change the holdings in the Seventh, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits, these circuits would also benefit from having 
their case-by-case approaches standardized. 
It is difficult to determine why circuits have not yet created 
and applied a substantial distance test for the robbery abduction 
enhancement. One possible rationale is that the Guidelines and 
commentary do not explicitly mention a substantial distance re-
quirement. However, courts have not hesitated to look beyond the 
statutory language of the robbery abduction enhancement,225 and 
there does not appear to be any reason why the substantial dis-
tance requirement should be treated differently. 
 
 223 See, for example, People v Sheldon, 771 P2d 1330, 1340 (Cal 1989) (holding that 
forced movement within a home is too insubstantial to constitute kidnapping); Daniels, 
459 P2d at 238 (“Movement across a room or from one room to another, in short, cannot 
reasonably be found to be asportation ‘into another part of the same county.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 224 Sanchez, 782 F Supp at 97. 
 225 See, for example, Osborne, 514 F3d at 390 (finding that an abduction occurred, in 
part, because the areas involved in the robbery were “divided by a counter, as well as a 
secured door intended to be passable only by authorized persons via keypad”). 
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D. Implementing the Balancing Test 
For cases in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, 
courts apply the robbery abduction enhancement in an almost ar-
bitrary manner, relying on a number of indeterminate factors.226 
Furthermore, these courts have repeatedly chosen to apply the 
enhancement to conduct occurring over very short distances—tar-
geting conduct that may not pose any additional risks to the vic-
tim.227 Although the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits rep-
resent an improved approach compared to their sister circuits, 
the Seventh Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have not yet formu-
lated a clear and concise approach for applying the robbery ab-
duction enhancement.228 
Because the dangerousness test and the substantial distance 
requirement are not mutually exclusive, courts should apply a 
two-part balancing test that looks to both dangerousness and dis-
tance. The Guidelines state that courts should apply the robbery 
abduction enhancement (1) if the victim “was forced to accompany 
the defendant” and (2) if that forced movement was “to another 
location.”229 Because the dangerousness test establishes whether 
the movement was forced, and the substantial distance test indi-
cates whether that movement was to a different location, this two-
part balancing test provides courts with a clear test that encap-
sulates the full meaning of “abduction.” 
In establishing whether the robbery abduction enhancement 
should be applied in a given scenario, courts should use a sliding 
scale.230 On this sliding scale, an abduction occurring over a sub-
stantial distance would require comparatively less danger for the 
robbery abduction enhancement to apply. Likewise, an abduction 
that poses a great danger to the victim but occurs over a relatively 
short distance would also meet the conditions of this two-part bal-
ancing test. For example, forced movement over state lines would 
constitute an abduction even if the victim is not placed in a par-
ticularly dangerous situation, but forced movement within a 
building would require the victim be exposed to a great deal of 
danger. The California Supreme Court uses a similar multipart 
 
 226 See Parts II.A–B. 
 227 See Parts II.A–B. 
 228 See Part II.C. 
 229 USSG § 2B3.1, Background. See also Part I.B. 
 230 Using balancing tests under the Guidelines is not a completely novel idea. See Todd 
Flaming, Comment, Laundering Illegally Seized Evidence through the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 59 U Chi L Rev 1209, 1210 (1992). 
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balancing test that looks to both substantial distance and 
whether the victim was exposed to additional danger.231 The 
California Supreme Court’s multipart balancing test is also a slid-
ing scale.232 
Applying this sliding scale allows courts to target the most 
egregious abductions: those posing either a severe danger to the 
victim or occurring over a greater distance. However, unlike a 
two-prong test in which both prongs must be met, a sliding scale 
test also allows courts to apply the robbery abduction enhancement 
to situations involving moderate danger to the victim and moder-
ate distance. An example of a fact pattern involving moderate dan-
ger that likely fails the substantial distance test is Hawkins, in 
which the victim was dragged by the hair at gunpoint “50 to 60 
feet” toward a getaway car.233 Hawkins involved considerable dan-
ger to the victims, mainly because the victims were forcibly moved 
toward a more isolated environment and because of the high po-
tential for injury involved in that movement,234 but the distance 
involved was slight to moderate, the duration was relatively brief, 
and no change in location occurred. In cases like Hawkins, in 
which one prong is clearly met but the other prong tilts the other 
way, it may be desirable for courts to apply the robbery abduction 
enhancement to avoid issues of underinclusion.235 
Furthermore, the balancing test provides the additional ben-
efit of preserving the distinction between the physical restraint 
and abduction enhancements. For example, forced movement 
 
 231 See People v Martinez, 973 P2d 512, 520 (Cal 1999): 
[T]he jury should consider the totality of the circumstances. Thus, in a case 
where the evidence permitted, the jury might properly consider not only the ac-
tual distance the victim is moved, but also such factors as whether that move-
ment increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asporta-
tion, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both the danger 
inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker’s en-
hanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Hawkins, 87 F3d at 726. 
 234 It is worth noting that, in Hawkins, the offender did eventually shoot the victim 
“pointblank in the stomach” after the victim refused to get into the getaway car. Id at 726. 
 235 Interestingly, the dissent in Reynos argued that a sliding-scale test incorporating 
both danger and distance should have been applied in Hawkins, although the dissent char-
acterized dangerousness as an “aggravating circumstance” rather than an element of a 
two-part test. Reynos, 680 F3d at 294 (Ambro dissenting) (“[T]he aggravated nature of the 
defendant’s forcible movement of the victim likely tips the scale in favor of finding that 
there was movement to a different location despite there having been only one building or 
site involved and/or a short distance traveled.”). 
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without a requisite change in location would not trigger the rob-
bery abduction enhancement, but it would still satisfy the re-
quirements for applying the physical restraint enhancement.236 
Cases failing either the dangerousness test or the substantiality 
requirement of the balancing test could instead be categorized as 
falling under the physical enhancement provision even if they do 
not satisfy the abduction enhancement requirements. 
Moreover, the original goals of the SRA, including proportion-
ality and uniformity,237 support adopting a two-part balancing 
test. The dangerousness requirement ensures that the robbery ab-
duction enhancement applies only to conduct that presents an ad-
ditional hazard to victims, remedying any issues of overinclusiv-
ity and ensuring that the robbery abduction enhancement is 
applied proportionally. The substantial distance requirement 
brings uniformity and consistency to the abduction requirement 
while also providing decades of precedent on how “location” 
should be defined. These requirements complement one an-
other—although the dangerousness test could potentially in-
crease judicial discretion by implementing an open-ended stand-
ard, the substantial distance requirement provides a check on 
that discretion. Compared to the flexible analysis currently used 
by many courts,238 this two-part test would greatly constrain 
courts applying the robbery abduction enhancement. Further-
more, this two-part balancing test would have the added benefit 
of preserving the distinction between physical restraint and ab-
duction for Guidelines purposes. 
If we apply the two-part balancing test described above to the 
facts in Reynos, we can further see how this proposed test would 
function. Because the distance in Reynos was between thirty-four 
and thirty-nine feet at most,239 the fact pattern would likely fail 
the substantial distance requirement.240 Additionally, Reynos 
would probably fail the dangerousness test because there does not 
appear to be any evidence that the forced movement substantially 
increased the danger posed to the victims.241 Unlike Hawkins, in 
 
 236 Fisher, 132 F3d at 1329 (“The enhancement for physical restraint is applicable 
when the defendant uses force to impede others from interfering with commission of the 
offense.”). 
 237 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1A3 at 1.2–1.3 (1987). 
 238 See, for example, Hawkins, 87 F3d at 727–28. 
 239 Reynos, 680 F3d at 290. 
 240 Part III.C.3 applies the substantial distance element of the two-part test to Reynos 
in further detail. 
 241 Part III.B.2 applies the dangerousness test to Reynos in greater detail. 
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which we apply the abduction enhancement because the danger-
ousness makes up for the lack of distance, Reynos fails both the 
dangerousness test and the substantial distance test. This two-
part balancing test would remedy the circuit split addressed in 
Part II and alleviate the issues arising out of the overly flexible 
approach advocated for by the majority of circuits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Tenth Circuits have applied an overly precise interpretation of 
“location.” These circuits have used the robbery abduction en-
hancement provision in USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) to apply a four-
level enhancement when a physical restraint enhancement would 
be more appropriate. The Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit 
have remedied some of these issues but have not gone far enough 
in creating a permanent solution. To address these issues, this 
Comment advocates adopting a balancing test that looks to both 
dangerousness and distance. Both principles are heavily rooted in 
abduction case law, much of which has been developed precisely to 
remedy overinclusive statutory language in similar contexts. Fi-
nally, the adoption of the balancing test would preserve the bound-
ary between the physical restraint and abduction enhancements. 
